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RUSH RHEES ON PHILOSOPHY AND
RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE
Lars Hertzberg

Rush Rhees is primarily known as an expOlmder ofWittgenstein's philosophy.
However, his depth and originality as a thinker is increasingly recognized,
largely due to the posthumous publication of his Nachlass. In this essay, characteristic features of Rhees's philosophical style and method are conveyed
through comparing and contrasting them with those of Wittgenstein. Rhees, it
is found, is more of a dialogical thinker than Wittgenstein. His most distinctive
contributions to philosophy were concerned with language and religion.
Rhees's views on the unity of language are compared with those of
Wittgenstein, and in conclusion Rhees's thinking about religion is presented
through a close reading of one of his essays on that topic.

In the English-speaking philosophical establishment, Rush Rhees has come
to be seen as little more than a student and expounder of Ludwig
Wittgenstein's views. This characterization, however, is far from doing him
justice: he was in fact a deeply original philosopher in his own right, as is
obvious from a careful reading of what he published, and even more so
from the large body of work that is posthumously being made available
through the editorship of D. Z. Phillips1. In fact, the relation between his
thought and that of Wittgenstein would merit careful scrutiny.
There are, J believe, several reasons for the neglect of Rhees's own philosophy. While becoming known as Wittgenstein's literary executor, he
himself published sparingly in his life-time, and most of the work of his
own that he saw off to the publisher was either editorial comments or discussions of Wittgenstein's life and his philosophy. Readers may have overlooked the fact that one of his best-known articles, "Wittgenstein's
Builders", is deeply critical of a central aspect of Wittgenstein's thinking.
Another reason is what I would consider Rhees's lack of concern with his
own fame. He felt no need to underscore his own originality, and he was
anxious to acknowledge his indebtedness, such as it was, to Wittgenstein.'
But, most important, there was a genuine affinity in philosophical outlook
between Wittgenstein and Rhees, as shown both in their style of doing philosophy and in their view of the philosopher's task. Rhees seems not to
have fit the conventional mould of academic philosopher any better than
Wittgenstein did, as shown, for instance, by his unwillingness or inability
to play the game of self-promotion. 3 They both rejected the widely received
idea of philosophy as the testing ground of various philosophical theories:
realism vs. idealism, materialism vs. dualism, etc., sharing the view that
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committing oneself to one or the other of these abstract labels had little to
do with thinking seriously about the issues. And in the case of both, there
was a huge lack of proportion between the vast quantities they wrote and
the tiny amount they published. (In that respect, they would have been a
nightmare for contemporary university administrators.) Both of them
exerted their influence, above all, through personal interaction; this was
connected with the fact that their influence, by all accounts, did not just
take place on an intellectual level, but was to a large extent what might be
called ethical or existential. In fact, as they themselves saw it, the ethical
was here inseparably intertwined with the intellectual: one of the aspects of
Wittgenstein's view of philosophy for which Rhees had particular affinity
was the idea that philosophical difficulties are made intractable by the fact
that what they require, rather than cleverness, is the strength to overcome
one's own will, i.e. one's predilections concerning the way the problems
ought to be solved.
Rhees, in fact, came to have a very large indirect influence on contemporary British philosophy, through the mediation of his colleagues and
students at Swansea: among those who were more or less profoundly
touched through their interchanges with Rhees were Peter Winch, Ilham
Oilman, Cora Diamond, R. F. Holland, D. Z. Phillips, H. O. Mounce, and
David Cockburn, many of whom, in tum, as teachers and writers, have
had a large impact on further generations of philosophers. Thus, it might
be asked whether a large part of what passes for the legacy of the later
Wittgenstein, at least in Britain, could not more properly be referred to as
the Wittgenstein-Rhees legacy. In any case it is clear that, without the role
that Rhees came to have, the Wittgenstein legacy would have taken a radically different form.
This essay is an attempt to convey some of the characteristic features of
Rhees's philosophical style and method, in part by comparing and contrasting them with those of Wittgenstein. This includes a brief account of
their respective views on philosophy and the unity of language. Some of
Rhees's most distinctive work being concerned with the philosophy of religion, I end by attempting to give a close reading of one of his richest essays
on that topic.

Style and method
The personal nature of Rhees's engagement with philosophy is apparent
from the character of his Nachlass: this consists mainly of notes to individuals, generally to friends and colleagues. Winch has spoken about the profound impact that a letter from Rhees had on his own philosophical development. 4 Rhees was engaging in dialogue, not debate; a distinction he clarifies in one of his notes: "what we call debating ... is a matter of trying to
make an impression on somebody else than the person with whom, or
against whom, you are talking - it is not even clear to what person you are
talking, so that a debate in this way is not a conversation in one sense at
all".5 Whereas academic writing tends to have the character of debate, it is
clear that what counted for Rhees was conversation in the full sense, an
exchange in which there was no doubt about whom you were talking to.

RHEES ON PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE

433

One is reminded here that one of Rhees's guiding stars in philosophy was
Socrates, as presented by Plato. As Socrates says, in the Gorgias (474 a): " ...
I know how to produce one witness to the truth, the man to whom I am
talking .... [W]ith the many I will not even enter into discussion." (It may
be significant that Wittgenstein, for his part, did not have much time for
Plato.)
In this respect, Rhees's papers are quite unlike Wittgenstein's. While
Rhees is responding to someone else's remarks, Wittgenstein's starting
point is his own intellectual temptations. Even when his notes are inspired
by reading or talking about some thinker (St Augustine, Goethe, Frege,
Freud, Moore, Russell), that thinker soon recedes to the background.
Wittgenstein wrote notes almost every day, and he would then tryout different ways of compiling them with a view to ultimate publication. But
though his notes were not intended as contributions to current debate in
philosophy, neither were they written for particular persons; rather, one
might say, they were written for posterity. While Wittgenstein did not
aspire to fame, it is obvious that he was not indifferent to the sort of impact
his work would have on the course of philosophy. This is clear from some
of the reflections that have been assembled in Culture and Value.
Concerning a book he was planning to publish, Wittgenstein wrote, "This
book is intended for only a small circle of people". What he had in mind
was not a specific group of individuals, but people who were in tune with
his way of thinking. 6
It is hard to imagine Rhees having such worries, and though he did
leave a mark on 20 th century philosophy this was not by design. In a generally favourable review of the posthumous collection Moral Questions7, the
reviewer ends by expressing his doubts about whether the book will have
any impact on contemporary debate. I do not know whether he considers
that a reflection on Rhees or a reflection on the state of debate. In any case,
the question would not have bothered Rhees.
This is connected with another difference between their writings:
Wittgenstein seems to have made a clear separation between two sorts of
question: on the one hand, the (shall we say?) timeless and impersonal
philosophical questions that are the subject matter not only of the Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus s, but also (though in a different form) of the book that
he was continually preparing during the 1930's and 1940's but never finished, and of which the posthumous Philosophical Investigations" is the closest representation; and, on the other hand, what might be labelled questions of "culture and value": questions engaging his individual existence or
provoked by his times, e.g. matters of art and aesthetics, religion, ethics,
psychoanalysis or anthropology. It is striking that, while there are plenty of
discussions of such topics both in his notebooks and in his lectures, no reference is made to any of them in the selection which forms the basis of
Philosophical Investigations. There can be no doubt that this was a very conscious choice on Wittgenstein's part (one that Wittgenstein's commentators, for the most part, have overlooked). In Rhees's case, the work on religion is as close to the core of his thinking as that, say, on philosophy and
language. If there is a division in Rhees, it is between commentaries on
Wittgenstein (as it were his "official" work), which he was willing to pub-
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lish, and his own independent thinking, which he seemed content to share
with his friends and colleagues.
This brings us to some points of style and method. Philosophical
Investigations is of course compiled as a sequence of remarks varying in
character as well as length (between a line and a page). Wittgenstein's aim
is to elicit the active cooperation of the reader. The few short remarks are
often epigrammatic in character, involving the use of striking simile. Many
of the longer remarks are like a tool kit: they often contain suggestions for
thought-experiments, exercises to be carried out by the reader, or small bits
of dialogue, in which the reader must learn to distinguish between the
voice expressing the view of the writer's alter ego still in the grips of misleading pictures, or misunderstanding the other party's responses, and that
of the writer himself trying to disentangle the confusions.
Rhees's rhetoric is very different from Wittgenstein's, though quite as
distinctive. Perhaps it is best characterized as an absence of rhetoric: he does
not use striking simile, formulates no epigrams. The flow in his texts is
much more even than that of Wittgenstein: like that of an even breath.
Rhees often proceeds by marking off the matter under discussion - this
might be language, conversation, faith in God, etc. - by alternately pointing out why this is different from something with which we might be
tempted to assimilate it, and why it is similar to something we are used to
consider different. The differences between their philosophical temperaments is visible even on a typographical level: Wittgenstein's texts are
made up of distinct remarks, corresponding to quick shifts of temper and
rhythm, as against the continuous tread of Rhees's writing.
In Rhees's texts there is a stronger sense of the author's presence; this
undoubtedly is connected with they way in which they came about. While
Wittgenstein portrays a stmggle with philosophical difficulties, he does not
normally convey a sense that he himself is stmggling at the moment of
writing (there are exceptions to this in the manuscripts). He is making us
see how bewildering something may seem, rather than expressing his own
bewilderment. In most cases, the reason he asks the questions he asks is
not that he does not know the answer to them, rather, he is drawing attention to them as questions, in order to show, for instance, that they are pointless. His attitude is aptly summarized in his remark: "My ideal is a certain
coolness. A temple providing a setting for the passions without meddling
with them."111 In Rhees's writing, on the other hand, the stmggle is usually
present in the text itself. Difficulties due to the subject matter and difficulties due to his own limitations are intertwined. One gets the feeling that
they cannot be distentangled. With Rhees, much more than with
Wittgenstein, one is witnessing philosophy growing out of his own everyday experiences and encounters. (I am not suggesting that one form of
writing is more valuable than the other.)
Perhaps it could be said (though I am not sure how far this is right) that
for Wittgenstein the difficulties of will that have to be overcome are mostly
difficulties that we share, whereas for Rhees they cannot in many cases be
separated from the person whose difficulties they are.
Wittgenstein and Rhees share the conviction that philosophical clarification is to be achieved through the use of examples. This is to forestall the
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predicament that Wittgenstein, in Philosophical Investigations, describes in
the following remark (§ 593): "A main cause of philosophical disease - a
one-sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example." The danger of doing philosophy without examples is that one permits
one's thinking to be guided, unconsciously, by one type of case.
Nevertheless, there is a marked difference in their attitudes to the examples. Wittgenstein's examples are Spartan; very often he only hints at a situation which he leaves the reader to imagine for herself. The situations he
invokes are often unfamiliar or fantastic. This has sometimes been considered a weakness of his presentation. In fact, this is the basis of Rhees's criticism of the builders' game in Philosophical Investigations, when he argues
that what the builders share cannot by itself be thought of as a language.
Rhees seems to be suspicious of the Wittgensteinian idea of thought-experiments.1l In Rhees, too, the examples are brief, often just hinted at (unlike
the fleshed-out examples, say, of Winch or Phillips), but, coming from
sources like literature, poetry or the Bible, or involving well-known phenomena in contemporary culture, they presuppose a familiarity with the
situation on the part of the reader, which must make up for their brevity.

Belonging to the language
One of the shared convictions within the philosophical tradition from
which Wittgenstein was trying to distance himself was that human
thought and language have one given form. Our thoughts and our utterances have reference to reality through being representations of the way
things are or might be. This account, it may be thought, suits the assertions
of natural science fairly well, but a problem might be raised with respect to
religious and ethical utterances (among others), since in their case it is not
so clear what they are to be taken to represent. Common responses to this
problem have been either to argue that these utterances too, despite
appearances, are similar in character to scientific assertions, or to declare
that they do not actually belong to the language. The most thorough-going
expression of the latter position was Wittgenstein's own Tractatus. (On one
reading of it, what he was trying to do in that work was to refute this view
of thought and language by carrying it to absurd extremes.)
In contrast to this, in his later work Wittgenstein was drawing attention
to the multiplicity of forms of discourse, which is bound up with the multiplicity of ways in which language enters into human activities. The relation
between a thought or utterance and the reality to which it refers is not, as
philosophers have been inclined to think, a simple relation that lies at the
basis of our dealings with the world, but rather our dealings with the
world show the different things it may mean for a thought or utterance to
be related to reality (and thus, too, the different meanings of the word
"reality"). What this amounts to has to be exhibited case by case. This is
where the depiction of various language games comes in, such as the
builders' game described at the beginning of Philosophical Investigations.
The emphasis on the multiplicity of forms of discourse seems paradoxical in view of the fact that the traditional division of labour between different branches of philosophical inquiry, such as logic, epistemology, ontol-
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ogy, ethics, etc. is completely absent from Wittgenstein's work. But the
paradox is only apparent: since the variety of forms of discourse is openended and unsurveyable, the traditional idea that there exist the separate
tasks of laying down conditions for logical validity, knowledge, reality,
value, etc. is misconceived. In the so-called Big Typescript, Wittgenstein
wrote:
Unrest in philosophy comes from philosophers looking at, seeing,
philosophy all wrong, i.e., cut up into (infinite) vertical strips, as it
were, rather than (finite) horizontal strips. This reordering of understanding creates the greatest difficulty ... But then we'll never get finished with our work! Of course not, because it doesn't have an end. 12
Rather than striving to take a stand on what can and cannot be said, philosophical inquiry will concern itself with how the idea that something can
or cannot be said is bound up with the context in which words are spoken;
in particular, it will have to combat the desire to lay down a priori conceptions of what forms of discourse are possible. This means that philosophical inquiry will acquire a kind of unity it has not traditionally had: the
unity which comes from considering each particular case as a particular
case. Philosophy gets what complexity it has from the temptations it is
unravelling rather than from the complexity of its subject matter.
Rhees, however, was convinced that this kind of account left something
out. If we think of speaking merely as analogous with playing a game,
some important distinctions are going to get blurred. This was the core
theme of Rhees's essay "Wittgenstein's Builders", and it is a theme that
recurs throughout his writings. 13 Also, as Rhees emphasises in the preface
to The Blue and Brown Books, this fails to account for why philosophers
should have felt such a strong temptation to provide a unified account of
language and its relation to reality.
All forms of discourse, Rhees wants to say, do have something in common: the fact that they belong to the language: even though there is no one
answer to the question what it means for an expression to make sense in all
cases, still the question is the same, or similar. I am not sure whether I am
able to appreciate the full depth of the matter the way he saw it, but in any
case he is evidently drawing attention to an important dimension of our
thinking about language. The following passage seems to sum up his position well:
If someone learns to speak, he does not just learn to make sentences
and utter them; nor can he merely have learned to react to orders. If
that were all he ever did, I should not imagine that he could speak,
and I should never ask him anything. When he learns to speak, he
learns to tell you something; and he tries to. In learning to speak, he
learns what can be said; he learns - however fumblingly - what it
makes sense to say. He gets some sense of what different remarks
have to do with one another. That is why he begins to follow a conversation, or to carryon a conversation himself. Or rather: it is misleading to say "this is why he does that", as though we had to do with
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a condition and what results from it. For in beginning to carryon a
conversation - in trying to tell you something and trying to understand your answer - he is getting a sense of how different remarks
have a bearing on one another. (PO, p. 185.)
Comparing speaking to a game might encourage us to consider simply the
behaviour: the uttering of certain sounds, in conjunction with the immediate context. Rhees is telling us to look beyond this. But what is this larger
context that is relevant? In fact Rhees's discussion might be thought to
point in two different directions, which are hinted at in this passage: to
what might be called the "having something to say" theme (or "the place
in life" theme) on the one hand, and the "remarks hanging together"
theme on the other hand.
Rhees sometimes speaks about sharing a language, speaking the same
language, but I am not sure how much this idea should be emphasized.
This would mean putting the focus on what distinguishes some cases of
speaking (say, cases of speaking English) from others (say, those of speaking Swedish), whereas what Rhees was concerned with was what different
cases of speaking have in common. Central notions here are those of a
"common understanding", a shared view of "what makes sense, what can
be understood, what it is possible to say, what one might try to say" (PO,
p. 193). On the other hand he makes it clear that he is not speaking about a
common (logical) system underlying all the different languages, the way
pure mathematics underlies all the different applications of mathematics
(ibid.). Evidently, the idea of unity or of belonging that is relevant here is
not one which entails any idea of a whole, of a totality: it is not a question
of delimiting an area. In fact, I believe that the two themes alluded to above
should not be contrasted but are inseparable. For remarks to "have to do
with one another" or "have a bearing on one another" is not a formal relation between sounds, but one that is constituted by their role in the lives of
the people who utter them: they are connected through that which people
are saying in making them. But at the same time, being able to say what
one has to say with these words, even its being something one may have to say
in the first place, is dependent on what has been said in these words
before, in other cases. Perhaps Rhees's idea could be summed up as follows: what we say does not make sense because it belongs to the language, but
it belongs to the language because it makes sense. In Wittgenstein, on the other
hand, there is hardly any discussion of "belonging to the language".

Religion, life and meaning
Much of the work collected in Rush Rhees on Religion and Philosophy shows
Rhees at his most impressive. In one of the essays, "Religion, life and
meaning: A and B", the editor has combined two texts that were written at
separate times but address similar questions. The first, brief, text is undated but was presumably written in the 1940's, the second text is a letter
written to M. O'e. Drury in May of 1956. There are marked contrasts
between the texts (but also interesting similarities of style) which help
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bring into relief some of the characteristic feahlres of Rhees's mature thinking about religion. Thus the essay constitutes an (unwitting) dialogue
between the younger and the older Rhees, somewhat like the dialogue
between A and B in Kierkegaard's Either/Or.
A is critical of religion. The central terms of the discussion are freedom
and servitude. The way to escape from our bondage to worldly cares,
Rhees says, is through activities that are free and creative, "where the work
is undertaken ... because it is worth working at, so that it has an importance of its own account and independent of one's momentary personal
needs." The examples Rhees gives are artistic and scientific investigation and contributing to the development of industrial production. In these pursuits, the activity of the spirit is free; "it operates ... as spirit, - or as intelligence, if you like" (p. 167). His portrayal of the ideal, it must be said, seems
somewhat elitistic. He pays little attention to the way, say, caring for the
sick or needy may also involve overcoming one's own momentary concerns. Religion, he admits, does call attention to the futility of a life in
which the spirit is dragged about by worldly cares, but he argues that the
deliverance offered by religion is false, it "calls for ... a servility that is the
more vile because it is more deeply rooted" (p. 166). He does not really
make it clear what he means by religion being deeply rooted or how that
makes it more vile. In any case, he contrasts two aspects of the life of the
spirit: on the one hand, there is the greatness of religious ideas - e.g. the life of
Christ, the story of the creation - that art is able to show us; on the other
hand, there is religious preaching. Religion as something to be preached, he
thinks, is servile because it is rooted in self-seeking, in preoccupation with
one's personal salvation, and because it involves spiritual pride in wanting
to reserve true goodness for those who believe in God.
Rhees's criticism of Christianity is hardly original. It takes it for granted
that we have access to an independent measure by which to judge the
Christian life, in such a way that any honest person, independently of his
or her religious commitments, will be forced to acknowledge its deficiencies. There is no room for the idea of a difference in understanding between
the believer and the non-believer. Part B of Rhees's essay stands this idea
on its head. Here he is trying to get clear about the Christian idea that
belief may give a person's life greater meaning or depth, as a way of
understanding what religion is. Now clearly he is not suggesting that we
should first look for whatever might be meant by a life having greater
depth, and then use that as a key to understanding religion; that would
have been similar to his approach in the earlier text. Rather, the two concepts are internally related: trying to discover the relevant sense of life having depth is just a way of trying to get clear about what is involved in religious belief; it is taking up a perspective on religion. Putting the matter
crudely: A starts with a conception of life and tries to see how Christianity
measures up, B asks what "a conception of life" might mean to a Christian.
Given Rhees's understanding of the task, it poses a dilemma, since it
involves conveying the sense of religious language without presupposing
that that language is understood, and yet without reducing it to some
extra-religious form of discourse.
Rhees's essay contains a wealth of ideas; here I shall only be able to give
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a bare summary of them. His discussion appears to have the following
implicit structure: he compares the expression of religious ideas by turns to
various other forms of discourse, by way of bringing out the similarities as
well as the dissimilarities. The first comparison is with expressions of will
or interest. We may say a person is devoted to God, just as we say someone
is devoted to art or science. However, Rhees says, the sense of "devotion"
is different here. Art does not transform a life the way religion may: living
religiously does not mean subordinating one's life to some particular interest or occupation, but rather letting everything one does be an expression
of one's belief. An artist (or scientist) might say that some cause was more
important than his life, but for the believer to make such a comparison
would make no sense. (Maybe he would say that the belief in God is his
life.) In sacrificing one's life for a cause one hopes that one's sacrifice will
help bring certain things about. But it would be nonsense to speak about
sacrificing one's life for God in this sense, as though God might be dependent on one's support. One might rather think about one's life as a sacrifice
to God. Furthermore, Rhees reminds us that it does not make sense to talk
about our devotion to God as selfless: the "selfish" - "selfless" distinction
has no application here. (There is no place for the idea, for instance, that in
giving one's life to God one might be settling for the second best.)
Rhees suggests that something may be learnt by comparing religious
statements with judgments of value, but at the same time the comparison
is misleading in many ways. In this connection, there is a penetrating discussion, which I am here only able to hint at, of the relation between
Christianity and Plato's conception of aspiring towards an ideal. Rhees
points out that the form of the good in Plato's conception is not related to
the world in the same way that the creator is in the Christian faith. This
goes with the fact that one does not worship the good. In Plato there is no
analogue to seeking God or seeking one's life, nor is there a conception of
sin in connection with the form of the good.
A religious conception, Rhees says, might take the form of perplexity
about one's life. Such a perplexity is like wondering about the value of
one's life. Yet it is unlike a value judgment, for instance, in not being
dependent on what actually happens. Tmight think 1 have made a mess of
my life: my career, my friendships, etc. But a religious perplexity about the
worth of my life would not be decided by considerations like those. On the
whole, it does not appear to be something one could try to resolve through
argument.
The word "perplexity", Rhees points out, has a special use in religious
contexts. Religious perplexity usually centers around one's relation to God;
in its extreme form, it is perplexity concerning the reality of God. This will
only be experienced by someone who understands religious language. It is
not due to my ignorance of certain facts, nor will it be reJieved through
some new observation. It is a failure to understand: one would like to say,
a difficulty with concepts. In this way it is like mathematical perplexity.
However, Rhees warns against taking the parallel with mathematics too
far. In mathematics there is no distinction between understanding and
accepting. Mathematical perplexity does not involve doubting; it simply
means that one cannot get things to work the way they are supposed to.
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With respect to religious language, the relation between understanding
and belief is much more indeterminate; thus (though Rhees does not put it
this way), one might be skeptical of the idea that there is some one way that
things are supposed to work in a religious context.
The situation is puzzling, because the separation between understanding and believing seems to belong in cases in which we may check how
things really are. But checking how things really are has no place in religion. So how is this separation to be understood here? Well, Rhees asks:
what is the difference between someone who simply repeats the words of
the prayer and someone who means them? The skeptic, he says, is not like
someone who believes there is no one at the other end of the phone line;
rather, he cannot imagine what it would be like if there were. Part of his difficulty may be with understanding what it means to address God as
opposed to addressing other people. This is a matter of understanding
how the way I commit myself through what I say differs in the two cases.
If I am talking in the presence of a large group of people, for my words to
be addressed to a particular person among them is a matter of the role my
words play in my relation to that person. But what makes what I say
addressing God is the role my words play in my own life. In other words: it
is the fact that the meaning of my words depends on their bearing on the
rest of my life. But then the question becomes: why will some people use
words in this way, while others will not?
The difficulty people will have with understanding how words are used
here is partly conditioned by contemporary culture. The idea of getting
things done, of establishing what can and cannot be achieved, Rhees points
out, is a central theme of our lives. We tend to think of a difficulty as something that is to be "measured against resources and capacities and methods" (p. 202). And in trying to think about God and salvation, say, we may
not be able to keep free of this technical and empirical way of approaching
the issues, as though it were a question of God's capacities in relation to a
specific task.
I have the impression that Rhees did not count himself a believer. Still I
find his ability to make a reader see what is there to be found in religious
language impressive and of a quality rarely matched by other philosophers
of religion. However, in conclusion I want to draw attention to a couple of
difficulties someone might have with his discussion. The first is not a serious one, I think. Rhees speaks about understanding "religious" language,
and yet it is clear that what he has in mind is Christianity - perhaps it
could even be said, one particular form of Christian faith. Is he then not
himself guilty of feeding on a one-sided diet of examples, i.e. of assuming
that there is such a thing as the essence of religious faith, embodied in this
one particular form of worship? The reason I do not find this a serious
objection is that it misses the problem he is after. Rhees is not here puzzled
by the word "religion", or by the question what different forms of worship
have in common, but is trying to make us see the sense of one form of worship, a form with which he and the person he was addressing were familiar. Other forms might give rise to other difficulties, but those were not his
concern in the present context.
The other difficulty is more intractable, as Rhees seems to have been
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aware. His long letter ends in a kind of paradox: he has been trying to
explain
why it is that a man who does not believe may be able to discuss religious matters - so that he must understand the language in which
believers speak of them; while on the other hand we may feel that he
has not grasped how religious language is used, and that in that
sense he cannot really understand it (RP, p. 205).
That sounds as if Rhees had set himself the task of squaring the circle. How
could a person appreciate that something makes sense in and of itself, and
yet deny that it makes sense to him? But Rhees wants to embrace the paradox. It is a characteristic of the language of religion, he is saying, that it
poses this very conundrum: that there should be a question, beyond that of
understanding, of whether one has really understood. Reflection on the
reading of Rhees's essay makes this obvious: one may appreciate everything he says in it without becoming a believer. (And one may be a believer without appreciating what he is saying.) That is to say, let one try as one
might, through clarification and paraphrase, to convey to someone, not just
the outer workings of this "language game", but as it were the beauty and
truth of it: sooner or later clarification and paraphrase will have to yield. At
that point some will leap and some will not. Others again will not even see
it as a matter of leaping. And that is all there is to say.14

Abo Academy
NOTES
1. For a listing of Rhees's main life-time publications, see D. Z. Phillips
and Peter Winch (eds.), Wittgenstein: Attention to Particulars (Houndmills:
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